Thursday, November 30, 2017

European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs: Documents

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Draft report - Leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements - PE 613.409v02-00 - Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

30-11-2017 06:55 PM CET

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Peter Simon

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 06:55 PM CET

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Peter Simon

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 06:55 PM CET

AMENDMENTS 191 - 392 - Draft report Banking Union - Annual Report 2017
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 05:10 PM CET

AMENDMENTS 1 - 190 - Draft report Banking Union - Annual Report 2017
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 12:00 AM CET

This note presents the summaries of two papers requested in June 2017 by the ECON Committee to external authors on "Feasibility check: transition to a new regime for banks' sovereign exposure". It also presents some relevant EU institutions' position on the subject.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 12:00 AM CET

This note examines the main features of the advisory European Fiscal Board that was established by the European Commission on 21 October 2015, in the context of the implementation of an integrated framework for sound fiscal policies, as referred to in the Five Presidents' Report of June 2015. This document is regularly updated.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 12:00 AM CET

This paper defines critical banking functions and considers whether there is a need for further legal/regulatory clarification if liquidation is the default option for failing banks. We rely on EU law and soft law principles (FSB) bearing in mind that 'liquidation' is at times a loosely defined concept. Despite efforts to agree upon a set of qualitative and quantitative criteria to assess the critical nature, or lack thereof, of relevant functions we argue that simplification is needed. Given the discretionary element in the determination of public interest and critical functions and the existence of different legal sources with different purposes, we recommend a consistent application of the resolution rules to build up credibility in the Banking Union project, considering in particular the differential treatment by the competent resolution authorities in recent Spanish and Italian liquidation and resolution cases.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 12:00 AM CET

The introduction of a bank resolution framework for EU banks has created the need for clear legal definitions of the main elements in resolution. This paper assesses one of these elements, namely "critical functions", which encompasses the activities of a bank that are of significant importance for the real economy. The assessment of the regulation and implementation shows that there is room for sharpening the definition and equal application across all banks. It is questionable, however, whether regulatory intervention is necessary given the on-going work of authorities at different levels. In turn, legislative intervention will be required to align the objectives of the resolution framework and state aid. The latter currently leaves more room for public support measures, which are not necessarily in the public interest.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP
30-11-2017 12:00 AM CET

Under the EU framework for dealing with banking problems, resolution is seen as an exception to be granted only if liquidation under national insolvency proceedings is not warranted. We look at the recent liquidation of two Italian banks to show how resolution and liquidation differ substantially when it comes to the scope of legislation applicable to the use of public funds. We argue that more clarity would be needed as to the role that the concepts of critical functions and public interest play in Member States' decision to grant liquidation aid, and that the two-tier system – in which resolution is done at the EU level but insolvency remains a national prerogative – raises issues in the context of Banking Union.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP


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